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THE VALUE OF VALOR:
MONEY, MEDALS, AND MILITARY LABOR
MATEO TAUSSIG-RUBBO*

ABSTRACT
The United States Supreme Court recently overturned the Stolen Valor
Act on the ground that the law’s blanket prohibition on falsely claiming to
have received a military medal or decoration violated the First Amendment
right to free speech. This Article uses the controversy provoked by the law
to explore the implications of offering compensation for military service in
the form of medals, in addition to money. How are these two, medals and
money, related? Should we think of both as government issued,
conventional forms of value? Querying the distinctions between money
and medals, and the ways in which the boundaries around medals are drawn
and policed, offers a means of considering the forms of value that underlie
compensation for the work of those who fight in the name of the nation. In
an era where value is increasingly assessed in monetary terms, what might
medals tell us about the resistance of certain forms of value to such
conversion? Furthermore, understanding the relation between medals and
money is of vital importance because the government’s increased use of
private military contractors constitutes a retrenchment from a workforce
that is paid in both forms of value – honor and money – to one that is paid
in money alone.

* Associate Professor of Law, SUNY-Buffalo. This Article was presented at McGill Law
School’s Legal Theory Workshop and at the Schell Center for International Human Rights, Yale
Law School. I am grateful to the participants at those events and to Mark Antaki, Hugo Cyr, Mary
Dudziak, Eugene Fidell, Owen Fiss, Paul Kahn, Paul Linden-Retek, Daniel Markovits, Kiel
Brennan-Marquez, Sam Moyn, Jonathan Sheehan, and Amiel Melnick for their comments.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

The official website dedicated to the Purple Heart, a medal awarded to
members of the armed forces wounded in action, recounts that the medal
was originally created by General George Washington.1 Ordered by the
Continental Congress to stop giving commissions and promotions, since the
Congress could not afford the extra pay these entailed, Washington drew up
orders for a Badge of Military Merit made of purple cloth.2 In 1782, he
directed that “whenever any singularly meritorious action is performed, the
author of it shall be permitted to wear on his facings, over his left breast, the

1. Ray Raymond, The Badge of Military Merit, MIL. ORD. OF THE PURPLE HEART,
http://www.purpleheart.org/Downloads/Raymond%20Badge%20of%20Merit.pdf (last
visited
Mar. 30, 2012); see also U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, REG. 600-8-22, PERSONNEL-GENERAL, MILITARY
AWARDS para. 2-8 (11 Dec. 2006) [hereinafter AR 600-8-22].
2. Id.
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figure of a heart in purple cloth, or silk, edged with narrow lace or
binding.”3
This origin story has been recounted numerous times of late, as the
United States Supreme Court considered, and ultimately struck down,4 the
Stolen Valor Act of 20055 – a law that prohibited the false claim to have
received a medal or decoration.6 Washington’s story was referenced to
illustrate how the current medal system can be traced to the earliest days of
the Republic.7 It was also cited because, in his orders, Washington wrote
that those who wore one of his badges without permission should be
punished, thus supporting the imposition of penalties upon those who, in
our own day, “steal” valor.8
But what is most intriguing about the story is not mentioned in the
court proceedings: the way in which medals and money relate to one
another as forms of compensation.9 In the story, the General gave cloth
because he could not give money. This may seem unrelated to the legal
dispute, since the issue in United States v. Alvarez10 was whether a free
speech right existed to speak falsely about having received a medal.11 Yet,
the prohibition on false statements is embedded within a broad separation of
honor and medals from money and market circulation. It is a criminal
offense to wear, purchase, sell, or barter military decorations or medals
“without authorization,” and they cannot be given in “exchange for

3. Id.; see also History of the Medal, DEPT. OF CAL. MIL. ORD. OF THE PURPLE HEART,
http://calpurpleheart.org/History_of_the_Medal htm (last visited Jan. 7, 2013).
4. United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2548 (2012).
5. 18 U.S.C. § 704(b) (2006) (“Whoever falsely represents himself or herself, verbally or in
writing, to have been awarded any decoration or medal authorized by Congress for the Armed
Forces of the United States . . . shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than six
months, or both.”).
6. Id.
7. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2548 (Kennedy, J., plurality opinion); Id. at 2557-58 (Alito, J.,
dissenting); see also Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 3, United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537
(2012) (No. 11-210), 2011 WL 3645396 (“The government’s tradition of awarding military
honors in order to recognize acts of valor in service to the Nation dates back to the Revolutionary
War. In 1782, General George Washington ordered the creation of several decorations
recognizing military service and valor . . . .”).
8. Brief for the American Legion as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 4, United States
v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012) (No. 11-210), 2011 WL 6210435 (“None other than George
Washington warned: ‘Should any who are not entitled to the honors, have the insolence to assume
the badges of them, they shall be severely punished.’” (citations omitted)).
9. As I discuss below, some groups do discuss the medal system as a kind of “currency” unto
itself in order to explain the harm done by “counterfeiters.” See infra Part VI.A; see also Brief for
the Legion of Valor of the United States & Criminal Justice Legal Foundation as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Petitioner at 4, United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012) (No. 11-210), 2011
WL 6210434.
10. 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012).
11. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2551.
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anything of value.”12 The prohibition on speech is but part of an endeavor
to create and protect a class of honored persons within the society at large –
persons described by the Congressional Medal of Honor Foundation as
“ambassadors,” bringing a message of patriotism and sacrifice to America,
each one a “national treasure.”13 Valor and sacrifice are often construed by
the Army (for convenience, this Article focuses on this part of the military)
as exceeding legal duty and what money can buy. It seems that the honor
bestowed through the medal is not commensurable with market value –
indeed, honor is often defined against money. However, this Article will
suggest the relationship between money and medals is not so clearly
defined.
The dispute around the Stolen Valor Act presents an opportunity to
reflect upon the relation between market and non-market conceptions of
“value” – a term deployed here in a capacious and flexible sense.14 Both
medals and money are issued by the government; both are conventional
forms of value. Are these simply two variations on a single idea of
currency, or are they radically opposed forms of value?
First, this Article examines theoretical efforts to conceptualize forms of
value other than as understood in the context of markets and money.15
Second, it probes the Purple Heart origin story and discerns two ways in
which recognition in non-monetary form relates to money compensation.16
In one, medals operate as a substitute; in another, they mark an
incommensurable, different order of value, a debt that cannot be paid.
These two conceptions – substitution and incommensurability – generate a
tension that is not resolved, either in Washington’s story or in our current
configuration. Third, the Article situates the medal system in relation to
some of the central features of our current military order and describes how
in the Army there seems to be a well-established social currency of medals,
a hierarchical system of valuation and reward that – while intersecting with
money, is independent of it.17 Fourth, in light of the legal, cultural, and
economic separation of the military order from civilian life, this Article
examines efforts to police and preserve the separate status of military
honorific value in the civilian world,18 including the Stolen Valor Act,
12. 18 U.S.C. § 704(a) (2006).
13. Brief for the Congressional Medal of Honor Foundation as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Petitioner 3-4, United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012) (No. 11-210), 2011 WL 6179422.
14. See DAVID GRAEBER, TOWARD AN ANTHROPOLOGICAL THEORY OF VALUE: THE FALSE
COIN OF OUR DREAMS 33 (2001).
15. See infra Part II.
16. See infra Part III.
17. See infra Part IV.
18. See infra Part V.
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which seeks to preserve “the reputation and meaning of military decorations
and medals.”19 Finally, this Article draws upon the discussion of medals
and money to assess the increased reliance on private military contractors.20
The line between medals and money is deeply related to the line between
soldier and contractor, all the more so when we deem the latter a
“mercenary.” While the soldier receives both forms of compensation, the
contractor typically only receives money, and is thus excluded from most
military awards.21 This shift seems especially worthy of consideration as
contractor fatalities surpassed those of soldiers.22
The main issue is how the policy of valuing valor and creating a medal
currency intersects with the distribution of power and authority in our
political order. Does valuing military valor through medals empower some
actors (those in the military, or medal wearers, and those who bestow the
honors) over others (the civilian population)? Alternately, might the
hierarchy of honor be a way for civilians to claim that their debt has been
recognized and perhaps even discharged? Paying in medals implies that the
money offered the soldier was not enough – that pay is never enough, and
that what the medal signifies is an ongoing obligation. This may be
appropriate, but it may also be troubling. Why not pay what is owed, now?
The medal system constitutes a domain of value distinct from monetary
value. As we will discover, this distinction is a fragile achievement.
II. NON-MARKET VALUES
This section critically engages legal theorists Margaret Jane Radin and
Paul Kahn, both concerned with sites of value not reducible to markets and
money – Radin with personhood, and Kahn with sovereignty. Finding that
both Radin and Kahn tend toward a dichotomous framework that
inadvertently reaffirms an opposition between market and non-market ideas
of value, this section turns to anthropologists David Graeber and Keith Hart
to develop a perspective from which the oppositions – between market and

19. Stolen Valor Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-437, § 2, 120 Stat. 3266, 3266 (2006).
20. See COMM’N ON WARTIME CONTRACTING IN IRAQ & AFG., TRANSFORMING WARTIME
CONTRACTING: CONTROLLING COSTS, REDUCING RISKS, FINAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 18-21
(2011) [hereinafter COMM’N ON WARTIME CONTRACTING].
21. AR 600-8-22, supra note 1, at 53-54 tbl. 3-4. The regulation lists which medals may be
given to United States or foreign civilians. Id.; see also CROMWELL GIBBONS, MILITARY
DECORATIONS AND CAMPAIGN SERVICE BARS OF THE UNITED STATES 66 (1943).
22. Steven L. Schooner & Collin D. Swan, Dead Contractors: The Un-Examined Effect of
Surrogates on the Public’s Casualty Sensitivity, 40 J. NAT’L L. SECURITY & POL’Y 11, 13 (2012);
T. Christian Miller, This Year, Contractor Deaths Exceed Military Ones in Iraq and Afghanistan,
PROPUBLICA (Sept. 23, 2010), http://www.propublica.org/article/this-year-contractor-deathsexceed-military-ones-in-iraq-and-afgh-100923.
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state, market and personhood, money and medals – can be seen as mutually
constituting.
A. MARKET-INALIENABILITY
Margaret Jane Radin has explored a concept of “market-inalienability”
by outlining what she describes as “property for personhood.”23 This is a
form of property deeply bound together with personal identity, as contrasted
with that which is fungible and held instrumentally.24 Using the example of
wedding rings, Radin urges that some forms of property, based on the
degree to which they are expressive of personhood, should receive greater
protection than other forms of property.25 A wedding ring belongs to its
wearer in a different way than other property might (perhaps the soldier’s
medal bears some resemblance). In linking property and personhood,
Radin describes an important category of things that resist marketization.
But the “personal” is not the only field that resists marketization, and
money is not only an expression of market value.
In addition to the personal property Radin describes, we can identify
forms of non-market value that are not personal, such as sovereign territory,
or sacred or religious property.26 There are ways in which personhood is
developed and relates to non-market value that emerge not as an expression
of an internal personal identity, but by looking beyond the self and finding
value in objects precisely because they are not of the self.27 Along these
lines, property scholars have extended Radin’s conception of personhood to
the collective level – peoplehood – in writing, for example, about
indigenous peoples. Kristen Carpenter, Sonia Katyal, and Angela Riley
urge that “Radin’s account of personhood captures precisely the meaning
that cultural property may carry for indigenous people: that some
properties are so constitutive of one’s identity that they demand treatment
that transcends – and surpasses – that of an ordinary market transaction.”28
This conception expands the frame on what is considered property and what
kind of entity holds it. But it is not only relevant to indigenous
communities. Indeed, in our society, sites, objects, and documents are
23. Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 960 (1982) (“I
shall call these theoretical opposites – property that is bound up with a person and property that is
held purely instrumentally – personal property and fungible property respectively.”).
24. Id. at 959-60.
25. See id. at 959-60, 1005.
26. As Radin has also noted. MARGARET JANE RADIN, REINTERPRETING PROPERTY 13
(1993).
27. For a similar critique, see Jeffrey Douglas Jones, Property and Personhood Revisited, 1
WAKE FOREST J. L. & POL’Y 93, 127-28 (2011).
28. Kristen A. Carpenter et al., In Defense of Property, 118 YALE L.J. 1022, 1048 (2009).
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similarly constitutive of collective identity.29 The sale of medals is
prohibited under the same part of the United States Code where we find the
Stolen Valor Act. We could see medals as a kind of personal property in
Radin’s terms, which perhaps captures how some veterans relate to their
medals. But medals express other kinds of non-market value as well, such
as the public, collective, or sovereign values the medal instantiates.
A second elaboration of Radin’s framework concerns an understanding
of money as an object of the market. We should recall that money as we
know it is as much a creation of the state as the market, and in some of its
forms it bears the sovereign’s inalienable stamp on its face.30 Keith Hart
draws attention to this in his seminal article on money:
Look at a coin in your pocket. On the one side is ‘heads’ – the
symbol of the political authority which minted the coin; on the
other side is ‘tails’ – the precise specification of the amount the
coin is worth as payment in exchange. One side reminds us that
states underwrite currencies and the money is originally a relation
between persons in society, a token perhaps. The other reveals the
coin as a thing, capable of entering into definite relations with
other things . . . .31
Hart contrasts a “commodity” theory of money – which usually contends
that money should be tied to specie – to various “token” theories, which see
money as a product of the state.32 In Hart’s terms, Radin may see only one
side of the coin – the market. To interpret exchange for money as being
only about the market leaves unexamined the manner in which the
sovereign creates money, or at least one side of the coin.33 The central
point is that the examination of different forms of value should not accept a
simple theory of money. The dichotomies that underpin Radin’s core
distinction between the fungible and the personal – between objects that

29. See Mateo Taussig-Rubbo, Sacred Property: Searching for Value in the Rubble of 9/11,
in AFTER SECULAR LAW 322, 322 (Winnifred Fallers Sullivan et al. eds., 2011).
30. Keith Hart, Heads or Tails? Two Sides of the Coin, 21 MAN 637, 638 (1986); see also
Bill Maurer, The Anthropology of Money, 35 ANN. REV. ANTHROPOLOGY 15, 27 (2006).
31. Hart, supra note 30, at 638.
32. Id. at 645-46 (“There are thus three types of theory opposed to the classical orthodoxy
which regards money solely as a commodity, subject to the laws of competitive markets. These
are all token theories which insist that money is a symbol for something intangible, an aspect of
human agency, not just a thing like a lump of coal. Money as trust locates value in the morality of
civil society; its fulcrum is the management of credit and debt in human relations. . . . Money as
the expression of state policy emphasizes the role of law and government intervention . . . . The
populist theory of money stresses the accumulated institutions of a nation as a necessary
framework for markets and finance.” (emphasis in original)).
33. See generally id.
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circulate and those that are kept; between the public and the private sphere
– should be placed in broader frame.
B. TRANSCENDENCE AND THE SACRED
Another perspective from which to analyze non-market forms of value
is through the lens of “political theology,” drawing on the work of Carl
Schmitt.34 According to Schmitt, market relations operate in the shadow of
the heterogeneity of the friend/enemy divide, not the homogeneity of
market price and exchange.35 Supposedly, secular notions such as
sovereignty are in fact theological in their core structure or source.36 Legal
theorist Paul Kahn, among others, has developed this trajectory in his work
on the political culture of the United States.37
Kahn’s project is to discern the ways in which Americans
simultaneously live in a liberal world of law and a sacred sovereign order.38
In Kahn’s telling, the sovereign and the sacred dimensions of political
order, visible in the notion of a divine king, are relocated to the popular
sovereign as popular sovereignty emerges in revolution and is objectified in
the Constitution.39 Where Carpenter found liberal theory problematic in the
context of indigenous communities, Kahn, similarly, finds liberal theory –
grounded in contract, consent, reason, and the practice and metaphor of the
market – an incomplete lens through which to understand our political
community and its own grounding in sacrifice and sovereignty.40 The
experience of the sacred is paradigmatically found in sacrifice: the act
through which the citizen gives themself to the political project. In
sacrificial action, upon which the state is founded and preserved, we enter a
relation inexplicable to the liberal order since liberalism deems individual
life the highest value. From Thomas Hobbes onward, Kahn contends,
contract theory cannot explain the moment at which the citizen gives their

34. CARL SCHMITT, POLITICAL THEOLOGY: FOUR CHAPTERS ON THE CONCEPT OF
SOVEREIGNTY 36 (George Schwab trans., 2005).
35. Id.
36. For different ways of conceiving of Schmitt’s use of religion – as analogy and homology,
among others, see Banu Bargu, Stasiology: Political Theology and the Figure of the Sacrificial
Enemy, in AFTER SECULAR LAW 140, 140 (Winnifred Fallers Sullivan et al. eds., 2011).
37. PAUL W. KAHN, POLITICAL THEOLOGY: FOUR NEW CHAPTERS ON THE CONCEPT OF
SOVEREIGNTY 38 (2011).
38. PAUL W. KAHN, PUTTING LIBERALISM IN ITS PLACE 251 (2004).
39. Id. at 257. Mateo Taussig-Rubbo, Sacrifice and Sovereignty, in STATES OF VIOLENCE:
WAR, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, AND LETTING DIE (Austin Sarat & Jennifer L. Culbert, eds. 2009).
40. Id. at 15-16, 231.
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life for the state.41 Thus, political violence and the military take on
particular significance for Kahn.42
To the immanent market, political theology counterpoises the
transcendent sovereign and state. Whether concerned with personal
property and inalienability, or the transcendence of sovereignty, both
approaches can be seen as arising in opposition to, and complementary
with, market value. How, then, might we envision a broader picture
composed of both market value and non-market value? Rather than
recapitulating the dichotomy between the foundational, transcendent or
inalienable sites that are fixed and ground a social order – and the value
generated through exchange, circulation, and movement – we should treat
the dichotomy as a whole, as composed of complementary and
interdependent senses of value. Rather than police the boundary, as I
understand Radin’s effort; or collapse one side into the other, as some
economists might attempt by declining to discuss value in favor of
individual preference or utility;43 or treat the sovereign order as distinct, as
Kahn does, I am interested in how the opposed forms of value
interpenetrate at times and are kept separate at others.44 In the divides
between medals versus money, and soldier versus contractor, we have a
provocative case study.

41. Id. at 63.
42. See generally id.
43. Modern economics displaces normative questions of value with a focus on individual
utility and preference. Value becomes simply the expression of individual preference – hence it is
a “subjective” conception of value, and the notion of value as a social, objective fact, as
developed, for instance, in John Locke or Karl Marx’s “labor theory of value,” is left behind. See
CARL MENGER, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 120-21 (1976) (“Value is thus nothing inherent in
goods, no property of them, nor an independent thing existing by itself. It is a judgment
economizing men make about the importance of the goods at their disposal for the maintenance of
their lives and well-being. Hence value does not exist outside the consciousness of men. It is,
therefore, also quite erroneous to call a good that has value to economizing individuals a ‘value,’
or for economists to speak of ‘values’ as of independent real things, and to objectify value in this
way. For the entities that exist objectively are always only particular things or quantities of
things, and their value is something fundamentally different from the things themselves; it is a
judgment made by economizing individuals about the importance their command of the things has
for the maintenance of their lives and well-being. Objectification of the value of goods, which is
entirely subjective in nature, has nevertheless contributed very greatly to confusion about the basic
principles of our science”). For an insightful discussion and review see DANIEL HAUSMAN,
PREFERENCE, VALUE, CHOICE, AND WELFARE 62-65 (2012).
44. See WILLIAM IAN MILLER, EYE FOR AN EYE 199 (2006). Miller maps out a position that
insists on the virtual unavoidability ranking, comparison and pricing (contra incommensurability
and other objections), while also insisting on how much more nuanced and complex comparing
and pricing actually is (contra economists who see a simple task of preference ranking). Id.
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C. ECONOMIC THEOLOGY
One recent effort to develop a perspective that encompasses value
broadly and sees transcendent political theology and everyday market value
as mutually constitutive is found in the work of anthropologist David
Graeber.45 In a retelling of the history of debt, he insists on the importance
of seeing credit as historically and analytically prior to money and barter.
He argues against Adam Smith, and much of present-day economics, in
which the opposite story is told: one in which a natural tendency to truck
and barter, along with a division of labor, led to markets, and thence money,
and finally coins stamped by the state.46 This traditional story has the
important consequence of making money appear essentially similar to all
the other forms of value that have come before, – albeit more convenient
and efficient. By contrast, Graeber’s story is one in which credit among
persons and communities known to each other is the first way in which
exchange was effected.
In many small-scale societies, to the extent there is something that
looks like money, such currencies – such as beads, shells, feathers, dog or
whale teeth, gold, and silver – are often “never used to buy and sell
anything at all.”47 “Instead,” Graeber writes, “they are used to create,
maintain, and otherwise reorganize relations between people: to arrange
marriages, establish the paternity of children, head off feuds, console
mourners at funerals, seek forgiveness in the case of crimes, negotiate
treaties, acquire followers – almost anything but trade in yams, shovels,
pigs or jewelry.”48 Hart makes a similar point in his discussion of the
renowned kula ring of the Trobriand Islands, where ceremonial exchanges
of personal ornaments (necklaces and bracelets) link trade partners from
different groups and over extended periods of time.49 These objects are not
money, where money is defined as a commodity and as medium of
exchange. But they are money in that they are “tokens of interpersonal
relations, a sophisticated device for ranking political credit in an unstable
environment of trade and war between communities.”50 These kinds of
money Graeber and Hart call “social currencies,” and the economies they
appear in “human economies.”51
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

See DAVID GRAEBER, DEBT: THE FIRST 5,000 YEARS 71 (2011).
Id. at 24-41.
Id. at 130.
Id.
Hart, supra note 30, at 647-48.
Id. at 649.
GRAEBER, supra note 45, at 130; see also CHRIS HANN & KEITH HART, ECONOMIC
ANTHROPOLOGY: HISTORY, ETHNOGRAPHY, CRITIQUE 6 (2011).
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Money as a portable, durable store and measure of value used in
exchange for everyday commodities is not the organic outgrowth of local
credit structures, or – in the economists’ version – an outgrowth of barter.
Summarizing a broad sweep of Eurasian history, Graeber argues that
money, states, markets, and armies emerged together.52 Where social
currencies had local value embedded in credit relations, it was soldiers,
persons who traveled outside local credit structures, who created a need for
payment in a portable form.53 To pay them, states collected taxes, which
inadvertently engendered markets where subjects would exchange
commodities for money, which was whatever the state would accept as
taxes.54
Intriguingly, Graeber urges that:
Money almost always arises first from objects that are used
primarily as adornment of the person. . . . There are exceptions
(cattle, for instance), but as a general rule, it’s only when
governments, and then markets, enter the picture that we begin to
see currencies like barley, cheese, tobacco and salt.55
These two stories – the depiction of social currency as arising through
adornment, and the emergence of decontextualized money as a product of
war and state formation – nicely confound our current contrast between
money and medals and provoke a number of questions. Are decorated
soldiers or veterans wearing money in this sense – as social currency? Does
this suppose that the military is a “human economy?”
Medals, as discussed in more detail later, are concerned with arranging
relations among people. The military does not purport to be concerned with
money accumulation as such. Yet the notion of a correspondence between
the anthropologist’s small-scale, non-capitalist community and our military
is perverse, or at least too decontextualized. The latter is embedded in and
advances the interests of the preeminent capitalist state, one which –
through the military and other institutions, especially in the post-war and
post-Bretton Woods era – has created and maintained, thus far, a global
order of value through its money. Thus, adapting Graeber’s stories, soldiers
may be wearing primitive money, even while deeply embedded in
sustaining money as an abstract, global form of value.
In sum, Radin takes an important step in mapping personal property as
distinct from the market; Kahn elaborates the continuing role of the
52.
53.
54.
55.

GRAEBER, supra note 45, at 226.
Id. at 213.
Id.
Id. at 145.
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transcendent and the sacred in grounding a market order; Graeber and Hart
urge that we consider the ways in which markets and states mutually
constitute one another. Each of these assists in an interpretation of the
medal system we find in the military. Probing the fragmentary story of the
Purple Heart helps lay out some of the terrain.
III. WEARING MONEY: THE VALUE OF MILITARY MEDALS
The Purple Heart website describes Washington’s invention as a
response to the lack of funds from Congress: “[d]eprived of his usual
means of reward [promotion and pay increases], he must have searched for
a substitute.”56 This suggests a relation between money and ribbon as that
of a stand-in or a surrogate. But this is an unstable relationship, especially
if we wish to find a common point of valuation. We might compare – as
did Adam Smith – the lost wages to the value we might assign to the
From this
enhanced social standing granted by being honored.57
perspective, we might worry that the honor seems like a trick or a “bad”
deal: calling a loss a sacrifice or awarding a medal may simply serve to
avoid giving soldiers more money.58 Washington’s story of honoring with
ribbon seems to speak directly to an effort to buy peace and to pay a debt in
another currency. In this reading of the Purple Heart story, the cloth comes
in lieu of “real” compensation.59 What looked like substitution, perhaps,
turns into larceny.60
This conception is rendered more complex when we ask what the
difference is between money compensation and ribbons. Famously, the
paper money issued by the Continental Congress had itself radically
depreciated in value by the time of Washington’s order.61 Thus, rather than
a clear distinction between paper money and symbolic ribbon, both are
symbolic forms issued by government, and both can be seen as substitutes

56. DEPT. OF CAL. MIL. ORD., supra note 3.
57. ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS 106 (Univ. of Chi. Press, 1993) (1776).
58. Id. (“What a common soldier may lose is obvious enough. Without regarding the danger,
however, young volunteers never enlist so readily as at the beginning of a new war; and though
they have scarce any chance of preferment, they figure to themselves, in their youthful fancies, a
thousand occasions of acquiring honour and distinction which never occur. These romantick [sic]
hopes make the whole price of their blood. Their pay is less than that of common labourers, and
in actual service their fatigues are much greater.”).
59. Raymond, supra note 1.
60. See Carol Rose, Giving, Trading, Thieving and Trusting: How Gifts Become Exchanges,
and (More Importantly) Vice Versa, 44 FLA. L. REV. 295, 315-17 (1992).
61. JERRY W. MARKHAM, 1 A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: FROM
CHRISTOPHER COLUMBUS TO THE ROBBER BARONS (1492-1900), at 68 (2002).
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for “real” value as measured in specie or a commodity.62 If we want to ask
whether the cloth used as adornment could have some money-like value, we
should ask the inverse question of whether money could have some nonmonetary value. In fact, radically devalued paper money was used by
soldiers on the body in lieu of cloth – as bandages to treat wounds and as
clothing.63 Unlike Graeber’s primitive money, which was worn because it
was valuable, wearing Continentals was a sign of just how worthless they
had become. Glimmers of this insecurity around the value of money have
recently made a comeback in the wake of the financial crisis – due in part to
the substantial creation of money the government has engaged in.64 This
has reminded many that our money is “fiat” money, and is not, since Nixon,
tied to specie.65 Nonetheless, fiat money has remained valuable and
relatively stable thus far, and we do not see soldiers and contractors wearing
it as clothing or using it as bandages.
Seeing the medal or cloth as a trick or bad deal is a cynical
interpretation, and possibly offensive because it fails to see the medal as a
symbol of transcendent loss and heroic action. Even if, in economistic
mode, we determine that the medal is a “good” deal in terms of the value of
enhanced social standing, this might seem an improper analysis to
undertake in that it seeks to find a single point of evaluation. For those
committed to the notion that there is a divide between market and honor,
such a homogenizing analysis treats money as commensurable with the
other ideas of value at play – love for comrades or nation, for instance.
This raises an alternative conception of the relation between money and
medals, one opposed to the substitution notion. Drawing on Radin, we
might call this conception one of incommensurability, that medals are not a

62. Id. Soldiers were also paid in certificates of indebtedness, “indents,” “when there were
no funds to pay them.” Id.
63. Id. at 68 (“A barbershop in Philadelphia papered its walls with Continental notes”); see
also JASON GOODWIN, GREENBACK: THE ALMIGHTY DOLLAR AND THE INVENTION OF AMERICA
72 (2003) (“An old soldier, wounded in the leg, used a bundle of his pay as a bandage, and coined
the word ‘shinplaster,’ which was later used to describe any sort of money that could not be
redeemed. A ship’s crew discharged in Boston, and paid off in now worthless currency, found a
way of making suits out of the paper bills and paraded through the streets. ‘For two or three years
we constantly saw and were informed of creditors running away from their debtors, and the
debtors pursuing them in triumph, and paying them without mercy,’ wrote [a contemporary
observer].”).
64. Ralph Benko, Fiat Money: The Root Cause of Our Financial Disaster, FORBES (Aug.
15, 2012), http://www forbes.com/sites/ralphbenko/2011/08/15/fiat-money-the-root-cause-of-ourfinancial-disaster/.
65. See Maurer, supra note 30, at 18; JERRY W. MARKHAM, 3 A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE
UNITED STATES: FROM THE AGE OF DERIVATIVES INTO THE NEW MILLENNIUM (1970-2001), at
38 (2002).
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payment, and that they could never be a substitute for money.66 But note
that the category of personal property does not seem adequate to describe
this context, even though it is one that is opposed to market valuation.
The awarding of the medal or ribbon is oftentimes not described as a
giving or transfer, but rather as an acknowledgement of that which cannot
be compensated.67 The fact that the item given often has little cash value is
not a defect, but rather helps to signal that we are in a different domain of
value.68 The individual is linked to a larger collectivity by the very fact that
they have not received fair compensation. It is just this “debt” or imbalance
which links the individual to the larger entity, turning an exchange relation
into a relation of incorporation. As Graeber writes of primitive money, it
“was not originally a way to pay debts of any sort. It’s a way of
recognizing the existence of debts that cannot possibly be paid.”69 The
medals are not beyond market value simply because they are within Radin’s
“personal” domain; rather, the medal helps mark the transformation of the
recipient from an ordinary person into something exceeding their private
self.70 The Medal of Honor Foundation articulates this conception nicely,
calling medal recipients a “national treasure.”71 But when the imbalance in
payment is not understood as an incorporation into a larger whole, it is
easily construed as larceny. Indeed, the larceny interpretation cannot be
excluded, at least as a latent possibility, because it is a precondition of the
incorporation interpretation.
66. See generally Radin, supra note 23. Radin does not use the term “incommensurable” in
her Property and Personhood article. I use the term to refer to the claim that there are different
kinds of value that are not comparable. Thus, for example, I depict the sense that medals are
given to recognize action that cannot be purchased with money as expressing a sense that medals
and money are “incommensurable.” I do not mean that, in fact or in some analytic sense, they
cannot be compared and ranked. In the abstract, it seems equally correct to say that everything
can be compared; or that nothing can be compared. Culture, we might say, is the scheme through
which a given community navigates between those two logically possible but sociologically
impossible positions. William Miller notes the conceptual confusions that abound in this context.
MILLER, supra note 44, at 237 (“Often, what precisely is meant by values and by
incommensurability varies from author to author. Some take incommensurability to mean strictly
requiring a single scalar metric such as dollars; others argue that the issue is not scalar metrics but
whether rational comparisons can be made. Comparisons require only that we be able to declare
something greater than, equal to, or less than another thing with respect to some value in some
context. Other confusions: some seem to be arguing against the marketability of certain things,
like love, babies, art; others are simply against ranking things hierarchically in some kind of
esteem regime.”).
67. See, e.g., Brief for Medal of Honor Foundation, supra note 13, at 4.
68. See, e.g., Brief for American Legion, supra note 8, at 3 (citing LT. B.G. BURKETT,
STOLEN VALOR: HOW THE VIETNAM GENERATION WAS ROBBED OF ITS HEROES AND HISTORY
(1998)) (“And one of the only things they get is decorations - 62 cents of material, but they’re the
esteem of the nation bestowed upon you.”).
69. GRAEBER, supra note 45, at 131.
70. See generally Radin, supra note 23.
71. Brief for Medal of Honor Foundation, supra note 13, at 3.
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Evoking Schmitt and Kahn, we might say that medals are not just
separate from money value, but in fact, the value of the medal grounds the
value of money.72 The recipient of the medal has, in the extreme case,
preserved the life of the polity and given their own life in so doing.73 The
effect of giving oneself for the political project of the nation, and the ways
this transforms loss into something else, into sacrifice, is evidenced most
starkly in Lincoln’s words at Gettysburg, where individual death leads to a
“new birth.”74
Washington’s medals were to be available to enlisted men, an
appropriate republican innovation, the Purple Heart website recounts, since
in Europe medals were for aristocrats.75 In practice, however, there were
very few of Washington’s awards created, and they do not appear to have
become an established social currency embedded in a military or broader
social community.76 The United States did not begin to create our current
system of medals until the early twentieth century77 – when the country was
far removed from an amateur militia or ideologies of Jeffersonian
democracy, and was, rather, on the path to overseas imperial prominence,
industrial warfare, and a permanent standing army.78 Since the actual
relation between money and medals will always be historically specific and
institutionally grounded, we must attempt to sketch out the relevant context
for our era.

72. See generally KAHN, supra note 38; SCHMITT, supra note 34.
73. This view is espoused in the American Legion’s brief to the Supreme Court, where it
quotes from Lt. B.G. Burkett’s book on stolen valor: “The Constitution does not guarantee
freedom; that’s a piece of paper. The only thing that guarantees your rights is the willingness of
citizens to stand up against our enemies.” Brief for the American Legion, supra note 8, at 3
(citing LT. B.G. BURKETT, STOLEN VALOR: HOW THE VIETNAM GENERATION WAS ROBBED OF
ITS HEROES AND HISTORY (1998)).
74. Abraham Lincoln, “Gettysburg Address” (Nov. 19, 1863), available at Yale Law School,
The Avalon Project, Documents in Law, History and Diplomacy, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/
19th_century/gettyb.asp.
75. Raymond, supra note 1.
76. DAVID F. BURRELLI & FENWICK GILROY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42704, THE
PURPLE HEART: BACKGROUND AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 2 (2012) (“Records are incomplete
and researchers debate how many soldiers received this award, but at least three sergeants from
Connecticut are known to have received the award after the American Revolution. However, the
Badge of Military Merit fell into disuse shortly after its conception.”).
77. Brent A. Clemmer, Challenges for this Kind of War: Modifying Army Awards for a New
Century of Conflict, AY 2011 SCH. OF ADVANCED STUD. 3 (2011) (“The Army organized these
tools into a system that was developed and refined over time during the United States’
involvement in World War I and World War II. New awards were created since World War II,
yet the basic structure into which they fit remains unchanged.”).
78. Jonathan Turley, The Military Pocket Republic, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 14, 31, 34-35
(2002) (discussing the rise of military as a distinct society after Civil War).
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IV. THE MEDAL SYSTEM IN CONTEXT
It is commonly observed that the United States military is a world apart
from the civilian order in many respects, including socially, legally, and
economically.79 The Department of Defense is the largest employer in the
world,80 although the Chinese Army and Wal-Mart are not far behind.81
We have a permanent, standing army. It is not, as was largely the case
through World War II, a force created for specific conflicts (although there
have been seemingly unceasing “small” wars).82 Since the end of
conscription in the early 1970s under President Nixon, with the support of
economist Milton Friedman,83 the military has been a volunteer force.
Finally, it increasingly utilizes a large number of private contractors, drawn
from many nations.84 These features of size, permanence, volunteerism,
and internationalized outsourcing are the relevant context within which to
understand the relation between medals and money.
The military order is simultaneously concerned with everyday matters
of production, consumption, and destruction, while also encased in a rich
iconography and practice that speaks to notions of transcendence, sacrifice,
and a non-material world of valor and honor. The Army Field Manual
(Field Manual) tells soldiers that the Army is “drawn together by shared
values and experiences, sacrifice, and selfless service to the Nation. All
subordinate their own welfare to a higher calling.”85 The mere labor of the
79. Jon Michaels, Beyond Accountability: The Constitutional, Democratic, and Strategic
Problems with Privatizing War, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 1001, 1086 (2004).
80. About the Department of Defense (DOD), U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., http://www.defense.gov/
about/ (last visited Jan. 9, 2013) (“With over 1.4 million men and women on active duty, and
718,000 civilian personnel, we are the nation’s largest employer. Another 1.1 million serve in the
National Guard and Reserve forces. More than 2 million military retirees and their family
members receive benefits.”).
81. Daily Mail Reporter, Defense Department, McDonalds and WalMart Top
Employers…But China is a Close Second, MAIL ONLINE, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/
article-2038401/Defence-Department-McDonalds-Walmart-worlds-biggest-employers-list html
(last updated Sept. 17, 2011).
82. See generally MARY DUDZIAK, WAR TIME: AN IDEA, ITS HISTORY, ITS CONSEQUENCES
(2012); MAX BOOT, THE SAVAGE WARS OF PEACE: SMALL WARS AND THE RISE OF AMERICAN
POWER (2003).
83. Brian Doherty, Best of Both Worlds: Milton Friedman Reminisces About His Career as
an Economist and His Lifetime “Avocation” as a Spokesman for Freedom, REASON ONLINE (June
1995), http://www reason.com/news/show/29691 html.
84. Katherine E. McCoy, Beyond Civil-Military Relations: Reflections on Civilian Control
of a Private, Multinational Workforce, 36 ARMED FORCES & SOC’Y 671, 676 (2010) (“In fact,
despite the fact that most PMCs are based in the United States or United Kingdom, approximately
90 percent of the PMC workforce comes from other countries. Depending on the site, between 60
percent and 65 percent of the workforce is composed of locals (called ‘host-country nationals,’ or
HCNs), with the remaining 25 to 30 percent being foreigners from neither the sending nor the
receiving countries . . . .”).
85. U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 1, THE ARMY para. 2.41 (14 June 2005)
[hereinafter FM 1].
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soldier is described as something of a sacrament.
While money
compensation is offered to its members – along with many other benefits –
the central narrative of the military is that it is a selfless servant of the
American people and the Constitution. The Field Manual tells soldiers how
General Washington defused an officers’ revolt that sought to force
Congress to pay their wages.86 It cites this as a foundational example of
military self-subordination and service, showing “Washington’s selfless
leadership and willing subordination [that] instituted the tradition of civilian
control of the military – a fundamental tenet of the American military
profession.”87 While the armed forces, in some crude measure of power,
surely seem able to overpower the civilian order – this submission and
sacrifice promises to foreswear such a possibility.88
Despite the ascension of market-oriented thinking, as evidenced by
privatization, even though soldiers are now volunteers, our law and policy
does not conceive of the soldier as simply another market actor. Economist
Milton Friedman described his role in the abolition of conscription as his
“most important achievement.”89 And yet in some respects the victory of
the market perspective has not been complete. Even though the benefits of
military service to the individual (including health care and education) are
openly acknowledged, “sacrifice” and valor remain central to American
conceptions of military service. Indeed, some argue that the advent of the
all-volunteer force has brought with it a separation from the military and an
increased but shallow societal reverence.90 In public rhetoric at least, the
soldier is certainly not described as “mercenary,” as Friedman suggested we
all are, all the time.91 And the medal system is one important part of the

86. Id. para. 1-14.
87. Id.
88. See Elaine Scarry, War and the Social Contract: Nuclear Policy, Distribution, and the
Right to Bear Arms, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1257, 1308 (1991).
89. Doherty, supra note 83.
90. ANDREW BACEVICH, THE NEW AMERICAN MILITARISM: HOW AMERICANS ARE
SEDUCED BY WAR 28-29 (2005).
91. Long after his participation on the Gates Commission, which paved the way for the end
of conscription, Friedman recalled a memorable interchange during the Commission’s hearings
with General Westmoreland:
In the course of his testimony [against an all volunteer force], he made the statement
that he did not want to command an army of mercenaries. I stopped him and said,
“General, would you rather command an army of slaves?” He drew himself up and
said, “I don’t like to hear our patriotic draftees referred to as slaves.” I replied, “I
don’t like to hear our patriotic volunteers referred to as mercenaries.” But I went on to
say, “If they are mercenaries, then I, sir, am a mercenary professor, and you, sir, are a
mercenary general; we are served by mercenary physicians, we use a mercenary
lawyer, and we get our meat from a mercenary butcher.” That was the last that we
heard from the general about mercenaries.
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public conception of the soldier as operating in a domain of value distinct
from the market order.
A. THE BUREAUSTOCRACY
Valor: Heroism performed under combat conditions.
Heroism: Extreme courage demonstrated in attaining a
noble end.
–ARMY REGULATION 600-8-22, MILITARY AWARDS
Over 210 pages, Army Regulation 600-8-22, Personnel-General,
Military Awards, lays out in baroque detail the Army’s scheme for
awarding medals.92 As compared with Washington’s short order, it is hard
to read the current regulation without seeing the articulation of a
comprehensive and effective social currency. It is a currency occasionally
linked to money, as when an award also brings with it a pay or pension
increase. But it also seems to be a free-standing order of value in a
thoroughly hierarchical order of distinctions in which the individual can
wear a record of their achievements on their person. The document
conjures what we might call – drawing inspiration from Max Weber’s ideal
types of authority93 – a bureaucratic-aristocratic world, a bureaustocracy,
with numerous and precise heraldic distinctions and complex processes. It
is a remarkable effort to capture and recognize the spontaneous, surplus act
of valor. Amidst the dense hierarchy, many of the awards seem to preserve
a notion of the meaningfulness of individual action.
The award system is one of the three kinds of compensation offered by
the Army, including salary paid in money, promotion to higher rank, and
awards (this is not to mention the many benefits offered to veterans).94 It is
important to underscore that the modern military is a “not-for-profit” entity
and its soldiers are paid a set wage.95 There are no longer bounties or prizes
through which individual soldiers or the military as a whole share directly
in the spoils of war (although pay can be withheld as a punishment).96 The
David Henderson, The Role of Economists in Ending the Draft, 2 ECON. J. WATCH 2, 370 (2005)
(quoting MILTON FRIEDMAN & ROSE FRIEDMAN, TWO LUCKY PEOPLE 380 (1998)).
92. AR 600-8-22, supra note 1.
93. MAX WEBER, 2 ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 668 (1978).
94. Clemmer, supra note 77, at 10.
95. With respect to the Navy, see Nicholas Parillo, The De-privatization of American
Warfare: How the U.S. Government Used, Regulated, and Ultimately Abandoned Privateering in
the Nineteenth Century, 19 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1, 14 (2007).
96. See Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 857 (2006); Bell v. United States, 366
U.S. 393, 401 (1961) (“Preliminarily, it is to be observed that common-law rules governing
private contracts have no place in the area of military pay. A soldier’s entitlement to pay is
dependent upon statutory right. . . . If a soldier’s conduct falls below a specified level he is
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Army explains that the “goal of the total Army awards program” is “to
foster mission accomplishment by recognizing excellence of both military
and civilian members of the force and motivating them to high levels of
performance and service.”97 Pay in money is tied to rank and length of
service and is not directly tied to performance. The medals are not to be
promised in advance as a precondition of receiving a particular goal; they
“will not be used as prizes in contests,”98 and they are not “gifts.”99 Awards
purport to simultaneously “recognize” and “motivate”100 and they are not to
be given in “exchange.”101 These medals are awards, not rewards. As a
system of signs, different pieces of metal and cloth arranged in the proper
order, the medal communicates precise information about where the wearer
has served (service medals for particular campaigns), training and skills
(badges), and notable individual conduct (decorations and medals). 102 It is,
as Brent Clemmer writes, a curriculum vitae worn on the uniform, legible to
those who know the system.103
The current elaborate, systematic, and hierarchical system of medals
and honors dates back to World War I.104 Despite the intimation that
General Washington is a direct ancestor, then, the emergence of the current
medal system is of a more recent vintage. In 1917, a congressionally
established committee clarified and raised the standards for the Medal of
Honor, which at that time was the only award for valor.105 Almost one
thousand of these medals were revoked in cases where the action performed
was not up to the new standard; wearing a revoked medal was deemed a
subject to discipline, and his punishment may include the forfeiture of future but not of accrued
pay.”).
97. AR 600-8-22, supra note 1, para 1-1. This regulation defines a medal as: “[a] term used
to includes [sic] the three categories of awards, namely: decorations, Good Conduct Medal, and
service medals. [It] also refers to the distinctive physical device made of metal and ribbon, which
constitutes the tangible evidence of an award.” Id. Sec. II, at 185.
98. Id. at para. 3-1(e) (“No preconditions for an award may be established such as, for
example, when Soldiers are informed in advance that attainment of specific goals will result in the
automatic award of a given decoration. Military decorations will not be used as prizes in
contests.”).
99. 18 U.S.C. § 704(a) (2006); see also Kathryn R. Sommerkamp, Commanders’ Coins:
Worth Their Weight in Gold?, 1 ARMY LAW. 6, 14 (1997).
100. AR 600-8-22, supra note 1, at para. 1-1.
101. 18 U.S.C. § 704(a).
102. AR 600-8-22, supra note 1.
103. Clemmer, supra note 77, at 2 (“Much as a professor has a Curriculum Vitae and a job
applicant a resume on paper, a soldier wears the symbols of success on the uniform. Although the
meanings of the multicolored ribbons on a uniform may mean nothing to the visitor, to those who
wear the uniform, there is deep significance, tracing a heritage back to the founding of the United
States, and even further to the Legions of old.”).
104. Id. at 19-20.
105. Id. at 17 (citing JOHN E. STRANDBERG AND ROGER J. BENDER, THE CALL OF DUTY:
MILITARY AWARDS AND DECORATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 17 (1994)).
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misdemeanor.106 When the Medal of Honor was rendered more rare,
additional, and lesser, awards were created.107 In 1918, Congress
elaborated a graduated system, one that recognized degrees of valor in a
“Pyramid of Honor.”108 In the Pyramid of Honor, each decoration – the
Distinguished Service Cross, the Bronze Star Medal, the Purple Heart, and
many others – is hierarchically defined in relation to one another.109 By the
end of World War II, the current system of medals was largely in place.110
There continue to be changes in the medal system, especially regarding
who and what kind of conduct is recognized. For instance, after General
MacArthur reintroduced the Purple Heart in 1932, its eligibility
requirements were changed by President Kennedy in the 1960s to include
civilians so that “advisors” in Vietnam could be recognized. President
Reagan again changed the criteria to include government employees killed
by terrorist attacks and soldiers undertaking peacekeeping operations (so as
to include the Marines killed in Beirut in 1983). In 1997, President Clinton
redefined the award yet again so that only military personnel were
eligible.111 Current controversies include whether post-traumatic stress
disorder should be recognized as a qualifying injury112 and whether soldiers
murdered in the United States by civilians or by a fellow soldier should be
eligible (for instance, the killing of 13 soldiers in Fort Hood by a fellow
soldier is currently considered “workplace violence,” not an act by the
enemy, as required for the Purple Heart).113 More broadly, Clemmer argues
that the awards system is out of date because it remains fixated on the statecentered conflicts around which the system was developed (i.e., World War
I and World War II). It fails to award “non-kinetic” activity, such as
“courageous restraint” at the heart of contemporary conflicts and
counterinsurgency doctrine.114

106. Act of June 3, 1916, Pub. L. No. 64-85, § 122, 39 Stat. 166, 214; see also Clemmer,
supra note 77, at 18-19; UNITED STATES WAR DEPARTMENT, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
SECRETARY OF WAR 211 (1922).
107. Michael J. Davidson, Bits of Ribbon and Stolen Valor, FED. LAW, (Sept. 2011), at 21.
108. Act of July 9, 1918, ch. 143, 40 Stat. 845, 870-73.
109. Id.
110. Clemmer, supra note 77, at 29.
111. BURRELLI & GILROY, supra note 76, at 2-3 (citing General Douglas MacArthur, War
Department, General Orders No. 3, Feb. 22, 1932).
112. Id. at 8.
113. Id. at 5.
114. Clemmer, supra note 77, at 42-43, 29 (“The World Wars continue to influence the
Army’s corporate identity and form the frame of reference for awards, while new
counterinsurgency theory and doctrine demand a different set of rewards. The design of the
pyramid of honor and the extent to which it has remained unchanged is one indication of how
entrenched this corporate identity is.”).
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This system – robust, complex, and requiring significant effort to
administer – establishes a world rather like Graeber’s primitive money, one
in which money is not used for exchange but rather serves to organize
relations among people. A person’s standing, history, and actions are made
visible on the body. The medals intersect with normal money in that they
may lead to higher pay and promotion, and yet they are not by the military’s
own terms a derivative system.
The medals also have two sides, as Hart said of money. On the one
hand, they are creations of the state and its formal power to create value.
But they are also understood to recognize a value not created by the state.
This other side, however, is not the same as Hart’s market value. Rather,
the most prominent awards envision and invoke a kind of action that comes
as if from nowhere – the individual heroic act. They evoke that which
cannot be bought, as in the requirement for the Medal of Honor, going
“above and beyond the call of duty.”115 Thus, while the other side of the
coin, for Hart, points to the market; the other side of the medal points to the
excess and surplus act, even to sacrifice. Indeed, medals seem better
thought of as anti-money, because they mark the divide between the
military order and commercial exchange.
It is not sufficient to simply note the opposition between medals and
money, or assert that medals bear some resemblance to social currency.
Even if difficult to define in a precise manner, there is an interdependence
of medals and money. For the broad reach of our money as a global form
of value depends in part upon the military’s global presence which, at least
according to the military, relies in some part on its medal system for its
“mission accomplishment.”116 Put simply, the global reach of value in the
form of money should be seen as bound to the social currency we find in
the military’s medal system.
B. GIVING ONESELF: THE ENLISTMENT CONTRACT
We must also locate the medal system in the context of the enlistee’s
relation to the military. The Department of Defense’s four-page standard
enlistment form contract, Enlistment/Reenlistment Document, Armed
Forces of the United States, DD Form 4/1, provides “[m]y enlistment is
115. AR 600-8-22, supra note 1, at para. 3-7. In the regulation’s index “above and beyond
the call of duty” is further described: “Exercise of a voluntary course of action the omission of
which would not justly subject the individual to censure for failure in the performance of
duty . . . ”. . . . ” Id. Sec. II, at 183. The Medal of Honor is “presented by the President in the
name of the Congress . . . .” Id. at para. 3-7(b). Others are presented within the military and do
not go through civilian channels. For descriptions of individual medals see id. at para. 3-17 to 318.
116. AR 600-8-22, supra note 1, para. 1-1.
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more than an employment contract.”117 It is what courts used to call a
status contract – like marriage or naturalization – one that changes the legal
status of the party.118 Yet it is has an additional feature, because the terms
are subject to unilateral modification.119 The enlistee agrees to boilerplate
language providing that:
[M]any laws, regulations, and military customs will govern my
conduct and require me to do things that civilians do not have to
do. The following statements [of law and policy] are not
guarantees of any kind. They explain some of the present laws
affecting the armed forces but which Congress can change at any
time.120
It is an improbable “contract,” by the lights of current contract
doctrine, since one party can change the terms as it sees fit “regardless” of
the agreement.121 It also entails what we would describe in the civilian
setting as the specific performance of a services contract – usually thought
to be an impossibility.122 Additionally, the soldier cannot send or pay for a
substitute (as could be done in the Civil War).123 This contract requires a
giving of the self, an incorporation, more than a bilateral agreement.
Indeed, it is something “more” than an employment contract, and this
excess is expressed in various ritual forms such as oath-taking.
Where Radin drew our attention to the link between personhood and
inalienability as a way to understand non-market value, we see something
rather different at work in this setting.124 Carpenter and her colleagues, in
their effort to extend Radin’s notion of personhood to the collective level,
write that what is problematic for indigenous cultural property claims is that

117. U.S. Dep’t of Def., Enlistment/Reenlistment Document, DD Form 4/1 ¶ C.9(a) (Aug.
1998) [hereinafter Form DD 4/1].
118. Interestingly, courts now seem inclined to claim that this contract is like any other
contract. Compare Qualls v. Rumsfeld, 357 F. Supp. 2d 274, 279-80 (D.D.C. 2005) with In re
Grimely, 137 U.S. 147, 151-52 (1890). The latter used the status contract notion, and, as noted in
Qualls, describes enlistment contracts as “special because they bring about a change in status,
from civilian to soldier, just like marriage contracts change a man’s status to husband and the
woman’s status to wife.” Qualls, 357 F. Supp. 2d at 152.
119. Form DD 4/1, supra note 117, ¶ C.9.
120. Id. ¶ C.9.
121. Id. ¶ C.9(b) (in capital letters in original).
122. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 367 (1979); see also Anthony Kronman,
Specific Performance, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 351, 372-73 (1978); see also, Udi Sagi, Specific
Performance of Enlistment Contracts, 205 MIL. L. REV. 150, 151 (2010) (noting that under a
straight forward application of contract doctrine, that “by entering into an enlistment contract, the
individual takes upon himself the obligations of a personal services contract, which cannot be
specifically enforced under normal contract principles”).
123. Act of Aug. 10, 1956, ch. 1041, 70 Stat. 19.
124. See generally Radin, supra note 23.
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“the classic view of property law, including its ownership model, is
intimately tied to a paradigm of liberal individualism.”125 In the enlistment
context, we have a powerful example of how liberal individualism,
fundamentally organized around the notion of inalienable self-ownership,
does not capture important parts of our legal order. The mere enlisting of
the individual soldier is itself a sacrifice of his or her prior self.126 The
enlistee is transformed, but this happens through an act of self, alienation,
namely the giving and pledging of the self through the oath. The enlistee is
degraded in being stripped of a prior legal status as civilian but is also
elevated in a new status as a “member,” as the contract says, of a powerful
entity.127 The enlistee bears the marks of public power materialized in the
uniform.128
It is from within this context of giving of the self and the oath that we
should locate the medal system. Despite the transformation through the
oath, the medal system suggests another notion – that the soldier has not
given everything. There is still some surplus that is impossible to extract or
alienate merely by an order or oath. This surplus is valor, sacrifice, and
heroism. The transactional form is quite nuanced because the enlistee gives
“more” than the traditional employee, and yet something remains outside
the relation, the giving of which the medal system recognizes.
V. EXPORTING MEDALS TO THE CIVILIAN WORLD AND THE
STOLEN VALOR ACT
The previous section suggested that medals may be seen as a social
currency, a “primitive” form of money often worn as adornment. But the
difference between social currencies and medals is especially apparent
when we leave the military context and examine how medals operate more
generally in society. We find many individuals making false claims to have
received a medal – claims that, because medals do not emerge from locally
monitored credit structures, are able to pass without challenge. First, this
section describes some of the ways that medals are used in civilian society,
and how Congress has sought to regulate false claims. 129 Second, this
section describes the efforts to explain the medal system to the courts in the
context of the challenge to the Stolen Valor Act.130 While medals are
125.
126.
127.
128.

Carpenter et al., supra note 28, at 1028.
PAUL KAHN, SACRED VIOLENCE: TORTURE, TERROR, AND SOVEREIGNTY 134 (2008).
Form DD 4/1, supra note 117.
For an ethnographic description of this process see generally JOHN W. BORNMANN,
BECOMING SOLDIERS: ARMY BASIC TRAINING AND THE NEGOTIATION OF IDENTITY (2009).
129. See infra Part IV.A.
130. See infra Part IV.B.
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understood within the military as a form of non-monetary value, in order to
defend the medal system it was necessary to show that medals were useful,
that they served to advance a government interest. Third, this section
describes how this issue came to a head in the litigation leading up to the
Supreme Court’s decision United States v. Alvarez, as the parties debated
whether the medals were incentives or awards, whether they were useful or
whether they were valuable as such.131
A. MEDALS IN THE CIVILIAN WORLD
The value of a medal is transformed as it is taken from the military to
the civilian world. Its meaning becomes more diffuse and out of focus as
the medal is transported to social contexts where fewer people are aware of
the precise meaning of each medal and do not know how to read the “CV,”
in Clemmer’s words.132 Yet, if the medals lose some of their specificity
when presented to an uninitiated audience, their display marks the bearer as
having crossed over from one domain to the other – and in this sense they
may become even more vibrant sites of social meaning. There are some
routinized formats and methods for translating and deploying medals in
civilian life: official formats such as Veterans Day parades; or more
entrepreneurial and yet still routinized efforts, such as when the decorated
veteran runs for political office or attends a protest and makes reference to
his or her status.
The setting apart of a domain of special status has attracted
impersonators and fakes. It is claimed that there are “staggering amounts of
medals fraud.”133 One newspaper investigation found a third of the persons
in Who’s Who claiming to have received a medal in fact had not.134 The
outraged American Legion recounts that these false claimants are
“individuals of note and accomplishment: lawyers, physicians, clergymen,
CEOs, business executives, company presidents, university professors,
career military officers, teachers, policemen, elected officials, even a
psychiatrist.”135
Congress has taken a number of steps to define proper use of medals in
the civilian world. In 1904, it patented the Medal of Honor – claiming that
the “ornamental Design”136 was a new invention.137 In 1923, Congress
131. See infra Part IV.C.
132. Clemmer, supra note 77, at 2.
133. Brief for the American Legion, supra note 8, at 16.
134. Id. (citing John Crewdson, False Courage Claims for Top Military Honors Don’t Hold
Up, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 28, 2008, at 1).
135. Id.
136. U.S. Patent Design No. 37,236 (patented Nov. 22, 1904).
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criminalized the unauthorized “wearing, manufacture, or sale” of medals.138
Under current law, it is also a criminal offense to purchase or barter military
decorations or medals “without authorization.”139 The limitation on
wearing medals makes it a sumptuary law, albeit in a qualified sense since
the prohibition has been interpreted to mean “wearing with the intent to
deceive.”140 Congress has not created a comprehensive database of medal
holders – so it is difficult to ascertain whether a person is lying or not.141
Medals can be given as gifts, even if they are not awarded as gifts, because
the prohibition refers to an “exchange for anything of value.”142 Many of
the criminal prosecutions policing the boundary of the medal system
involve a financial dimension. The cases listed by the Department of
Justice’s Operation Stolen Valor are mostly of this kind,143 for example,
where a false Medal of Honor holder receives a larger pension. While the
domain is incommensurable in its own terms – that is, one cannot buy
medals or the status they confer, and they are understood to not be
comparable to payment in money – the boundaries are inadequately policed.
If, in the military we are correct to see medals as an effective social
currency, in the civilian context the matter is far less certain. Consider, for
instance, a recent effort to encourage veterans to wear their medals more
often, which suggests that usage of the currency in the civilian context is
quite limited. The Secretary of Veteran’s Affairs urged “[y]ou don’t have
to put them on only if you’re in a parade. . . . Wear them when you go play
golf. Wear them when you go to the store. Let America know that you
took that oath and served.”144

137. Brief for American Legion, supra note 8, at 12 (citing H. REP. NO. 67-1484, at 1
(1923)). The design became subject to public use in 1918. Id.
138. Act of Feb. 24, 1923, ch. 110, 42 Stat. 1286, 1286.
139. 18 U.S.C. § 704(a) (2006).
140. United States v. Perelman, 695 F.3d 866, 871 (9th Cir. 2012). Barton Beebe, in his
analysis of how intellectual property law now operates as a sumptuary code, writes that “no free
market democracy would countenance such restrictions [that control competitive consumption
directly] on consumer sovereignty,” but here we have an exception. Barton Beebe, Intellectual
Property and the Sumptuary Code, 123 HARV. L. REV. 810, 815 (2010) (“We have thus turned to
intellectual property law because it is the one area of law (outside of prohibitions against fraud)
that is capable of protecting forms of distinction from imitation and overproduction.”).
141. See generally OFFICE OF UNDER-SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, REPORT TO THE SENATE
AND HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEES ON A SEARCHABLE MILITARY VALOR
DECORATIONS DATABASE (2009).
142. 18 U.S.C. § 704(a).
143. See Northwest Crackdown on Fake Veterans in “Operation Stolen Valor,” U.S.
ATTN’Y’S OFFICE W. DIST. OF WASH. (Sept. 21, 2007), http://www.justice.gov/usao/waw/press
/2007/sep/operationstolenvalor html.
144. Leo Shane III, Dust off Medals for Veterans Day, STARS & STRIPES (Oct. 21, 2006),
http://www military.com/features/0,15240,117426,00 html.
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The Stolen Valor Act of 2005 was only the most recent step in an
ongoing effort to constitute distinct domain of value and to police its
boundaries. It is especially interesting for our discussion because it does
not require anything more than a false statement – that is, the offense need
not have any monetary or other tangible effect. It asserts the value of the
intangible. And yet, it was precisely because of this separation from any
tangible harm that the law ran aground.
B. “VALUE BEGETS VALUE”
The criminalization of false speech raised a conundrum in the litigation
leading up to Alvarez. In order to justify the prohibition, the government
needed to demonstrate it had a compelling, or at least legitimate, interest. It
pointed to its own utilitarian need to manage the armed forces and motivate
soldiers. In other words, it spoke in the language of modern economics, a
language of incentives.145 Were medals incentives, perhaps like money?
Before the United States District Court for the District of Colorado, the
government explained its interest in the medals system: if the value of
medals was diluted by false claimants, “soldiers may well lose incentive to
risk their lives to earn such awards.”146 Judge Blackburn found this
conceptualization “shocking.”147 To suggest “that the battlefield heroism of
our servicemen and women is motivated in any way . . . by considerations
of whether a medal may be awarded simply defies . . . comprehension” and
is “unintentionally insulting to the profound sacrifices of military personnel
the Stolen Valor Act purports to honor.”148 It was improper to suggest that
valor and heroism could be viewed as forms of conduct that emerge in
response to incentives. Indeed, the court noted, “the qualities of character
that the medals recognize specifically refute the notion that any such

145. Clemmer cites one popular version, STEVEN D. LEVITT, FREAKONOMICS 13 (2005)
(“Incentives are the cornerstone of modern life. And understanding them – or, often, ferreting
them out – is the key to solving just about any riddle . . . .”). Clemmer distinguishes between
internal motivations (the desire to do a good job for its own sake, to provide selfless service) and
external motivations (a motivation outside the person or the activity). Clemmer, supra note 77, at
8-9. Interestingly, he includes pay, promotion, and awards as “external”. Id. at 9. But such an
external conception is apparently troublesome to many other observers (such as the Legion of
Valor), as discussed in this section. See infra pp. 126-27.
146. United States v. Strandlof, 746 F. Supp. 2d 1183, 1190 (D. Colo. 2010) (quoting
Government Response to Amicus Curiae Brief of The Rutherford Institute, United States v.
Strandlof, 746 F. Supp. 2d (2010) (No. 09-cr-00497-REB)), rev’d, 667 F.3d 1146 (10th Cir.
2012), abrogated by, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012) and vacated, 684 F.3d 962 (10th Cir. 2012), aff’d,
684 F.3d 962 (10th Cir. 2012).
147. Strandlof, 764 F. Supp. 2d at 1190.
148. Id.
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motivation is at play.”149 The Ninth Circuit, in its decision in Alvarez
quoted Blackburn’s assessment:
Even if we were to make the unfounded assumption that our troops
perform their riskiest missions in the hope of receiving the Medal
of Honor, there is no evidence – nor any reasonable basis for
assuming that some people’s false claims to have received the
medal has a demotivating impact on our men and women in
uniform.150
The dilemma the government confronted is intriguing: in order to justify the
law, it was necessary to point to instrumental policy concerns, but doing so
threatened to collide with the ideology of medals as marking off a different
kind of action altogether, one that evoked the importance of symbolic
meaning and incommensurability.
The problem of how to explain the government’s interest emerged in a
variety of ways in the amicus briefs submitted to the Supreme Court.
Before turning to the Court’s opinion, this Article will first contrast three of
these briefs. The Legion of Valor asserted that medals are a “governmentissued currency of valor.”151 Accordingly, the crime punished under the
Act is “analogous to counterfeiting.”152 In this conceptualization, it is not
that medals are tied to money – as in the prosecutions of those who cash in
on added pension benefits – rather, medals are themselves a “currency.”153
This series of metaphors, that medals are a government currency, which the
faker counterfeits, which leads to dilution, allowed for an explanation of the
harm and hence the government’s interest:
[E]very real bill is worth a little less for the existence of a fake.
The existence of fakes causes real bills to be examined with some
suspicion upon tender. We have all experienced tendering a bill
and seeing the cashier mark it with a counterfeit detection pen.
There is a trace of insult there, however small.154
Recalling Hart’s emphasis on the two sides of the coin, state and market,
the Legion of Valor’s conception of the value of medals is distinctly statist,
because the value comes from the government, and the medals are a
government issued currency. It is a “fiat” theory of money and value.155
149. Id.
150. United States v. Alvarez, 617 F.3d 1198, 1217 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct.
457 (2011), aff’d, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012).
151. Brief for Legion of Valor, supra note 9, at 11.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. See Hart, supra note 32 and accompanying text.
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As with such theories, it is liable to attack on the grounds that it does not
see money as simply a token or symbol of something with real value – be it
gold, or, in this case, an individual’s valor.
This other side of the coin is expounded upon in an opposing amicus
brief submitted by a group of criminal defense lawyers:
The winners of awards such as the Medal of Honor are heroes.
The honors that they have earned, based on these historic acts, are
not something that can ever be diluted. The idea that the
‘currency,’ . . . can ever be diluted relies on an idea that the honors
are part of a zero-sum game. . . . [as] if honor and valor is some
sort of finite reservoir and that when one person wrongfully
‘drinks’ out of that reservoir there is less of a supply for those who
are truly entitled . . . . The honor offers an intrinsic recognition of
the great heroism and bravery of the recipients.156
In this opposing viewpoint, the medals are not currency in a deeper
sense.157 They are not stores of value in and of themselves but simply
objects that allow an inner fact or truth about the individual to be visible to
others.158 It is as though the hero is per se valuable, like gold or a national
treasure. The medal does not create that value – it indexes it. From the
perspective of this group of criminal defense lawyers, the government does
not have a legitimate interest.
So which of these perspectives – that of the Legion of Valor or that of
the criminal defense lawyers – is correct? Hart’s point about the two sides
of the coin is that the coin’s value is at once social and statist. So, too, with
the medal. We simultaneously wish to refer to a truth about the individual,
and yet seek to use public power to stabilize the system of symbols. The
Army regulation discussed earlier touches upon this point in its definition of
decorations as “mark[s] of honor denoting heroism or meritorious/
outstanding service/achievement.”159 It does not purport to constitute value.
Perhaps the most intriguing effort to explain the government’s interest
can be found in the amicus brief of The Medal of Honor Foundation. 160
The “purpose behind such awards is not merely to honor brave and heroic
deeds, but to inspire emulation.”161 They “inspire” soldiers “to engage the
156. Brief for the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Respondent at 36, United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012) (No. 11-210),
2012 WL 215300 (emphasis in original).
157. Id.
158. See id.
159. AR 600-8-22, supra note 1, Sec. II, at 184 (emphasis added).
160. Brief for the Medal of Honor Foundation, supra note 13, at 9-10.
161. Id. at 9.
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enemy, and to be ready to act cohesively as a unit despite the danger and
chaos they will encounter. It inspires most to carry on while others are
falling around them.”162 In short, the medal system serves to “inspire
heroic acts without thought of receiving a medal.”163 Evidently, what the
Medal of Honor Foundation called the Ninth Circuit’s “superficial analysis”
hit a nerve.164
Implicit in the court’s reasoning was the notion that the only way to
understand the need to regulate medals was if they were incentives and this,
in turn, implied that soldiers were conscious, calculating, benefit-seeking
actors – this was what was “shocking” to the district court. The problem
the Medal of Honor Foundation confronted was subtle: how to explain the
instrumental importance of the medal system without degrading the heroic
and sacrificial action as something triggered by a shallow desire to be given
an honor or award. The Legion of Valor sought refuge in the metaphor of
currency and dilution, but this argument ran into the accusation that it was
too statist. The Medal of Honor’s answer was that medals were not only
about recognition – they transformed soldiers through “emulation,” not
conscious award-seeking behavior.165 Indeed, they acted “without thought
of receiving a medal.”166 The amici squared the circle of combining
instrumental rationales with the excess of sacrifice by asserting, in a
striking formulation, that “valor begets valor.”167 Valor is not generated by
desire for money or even desire for recognition. Nor is it simply a stategenerated product. It is a self-sustaining cultural value, one that needs
some state protection, but is not state-created.
Taken together, the three groups each illustrate a different side of the
issue: the value of medals is simultaneously created by the state and by
action that is not within its control. The Medal of Honor Foundation’s
notion that valor begets valor seems to offer the best synthesis since it also
understands that at issue is a general social value – not simply a state
product or individual transactions and actions. But it was not enough, it
turned out, to sustain the Act.
By the time the litigation reached the Supreme Court, the government
made clear that it rejected the view that soldiers “rise to the occasion purely

162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

Id. at 10.
Id. at 6 (emphasis added).
Id. at 26.
Id. at 6.
Id.
Id. at 33.
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in hopes of receiving a medal.”168 It also argued that simply because
awards are not incentives, this need “not detract from the force of the armed
services’ longstanding view that military awards are a vital means of
inspiring higher performance and maintaining the morale necessary for
effective unit performance.”169 In other words, the government urged that
the awards could be seen as both recognizing valor and as instrumental.
C. THE ALVAREZ DECISION
The tensions over how to understand the medals system were in full
view in the Supreme Court’s opinion overturning the Stolen Valor Act.170
The case dealt with false statements made by Xavier Alvarez, who, when
introducing himself as a new member of his local water board in California,
said: “I’m a retired marine of 25 years. I retired in the year 2001. Back in
1987, I was awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor. I got wounded
many times by the same guy.”171 These were all false statements, made not
for any financial gain, but simply, Justice Kennedy thought, as “a pathetic
attempt to gain respect that eluded him.”172
A majority voted to strike down the law. But if we isolate the question
of what kind of value is at issue, the matter is more complicated. In his
plurality opinion, Justice Kennedy, joined by Chief Justice Roberts, and
Justices Ginsberg, and Sotomayor, contrasted the law to other prohibitions
on lying since here there was no “legally cognizable harm.”173 While
perjury undercuts the judicial system and falsely representing oneself as an
official undermines government, the Act “targets falsity and nothing
more.”174 The lack of a link to monetary or some other tangible gain was
deeply problematic: “a ban on speech, absent any evidence that the speech
was used to gain a material advantage . . . would give government a broad
censorial power.”175 It is as though the government has been too successful
in creating an incommensurable domain of value – merely claiming to be a
member was itself sufficiently attractive, without any other tangible gain.
In any case, as the offense was not linked to a “material advantage,” the law

168. Brief for the United States 39 n.8, United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012) (No.
11-210), 2011 WL 6019906.
169. Id.
170. United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012).
171. Id. at 2542 (quoting United States v. Alvarez, 617 F.3d 1198, 1201-02 (9th Cir. 2010)).
172. Id.
173. Id. at 2545 (Kennedy, J., plurality opinion).
174. Id.
175. Id. at 2548.
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fell outside the small number of permissible content-based restrictions on
speech and was thus subject to fatal “exacting scrutiny.”176
Justice Kennedy recognized the government’s “compelling interests” in
the medal system since “public recognition of valor and noble
sacrifice . . . reinforces the pride and national resolve that the military relies
upon to fulfill its mission.”177 But he was skeptical that there was a “direct
causal link” between the prohibition and the interest protected.178 It was not
enough to claim, as did the government, that it was “common sense” that
liars “‘dilute the value and meaning of military awards.’”179 While a link to
monetary gain would have assuaged Kennedy’s concerns in his analysis of
why lying was prohibited, he did not see the medal system as another
currency, another artificially created symbolic order of scarcity, in which it
would be axiomatic or “common sense” that an increase in supply dilutes
relative value. Instead, Kennedy tended toward a conception of the medals
as recognizing heroism, not constituting a form of value. Approvingly
quoting the Veterans of Foreign Wars amicus brief, Kennedy declared that
the “general proposition is sound” that “‘there is nothing that charlatans
such as Xavier Alvarez can do to stain [the Medal winners’] honor.’”180
That is, the value recognized is inherent in the Act. Moreover, there was a
less burdensome way to advance the government’s interest, namely through
public refutation and shaming of liars, as happened to Alvarez, not criminal
prosecution. Rather than seeing a problem of counterfeiting, the problem
was speech and the solution was “counter-speech.”181 He did, however,
turn to the favored commercial metaphor in the free speech context: the
“best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the
competition of the market.”182 The public outrage directed at Alvarez’s lies
“fully vindicated” the government and the genuine medal holder’s
interests.183 In a flourish, Justice Kennedy noted that the “American people
do not need the assistance of a government prosecution to express their high
regard for the special place military heroes hold in our tradition. . . . Truth

176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 2549.
179. Id. (quoting Brief for the United States 54, United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537
(2012) (No. 11-210), 2011 WL 6019906).
180. Id. (quoting Brief for the United States 54, United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537
(2012) (No. 11-210), 2011 WL 6019906).
181. Id.
182. Id. at 2550 (citations omitted).
183. Id.
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needs neither a handcuffs nor a badge for its vindication.”184 However, a
currency very well might.
Justice Kennedy underscored his desire to move away from
contemplating intangibles by indicating that the Stolen Valor Act would be
less vulnerable if linked to “fraud or [undertaking to] secure moneys or
other valuable consideration.”185 Such a law would return us to more easily
grasped notions of value as connected to money or some other tangible
valuation, relieving us of the quandary of just what it means to “steal”
valor.
Even though the Act was overturned, there were five Justices who
accepted the claim that liars presumably harm the medal system. Justice
Breyer, concurring (with Justice Kagan), wrote that to “permit those who
have not earned those honors to claim otherwise dilutes the value of the
awards,”186 and he did not question what Justice Kennedy called the “causal
connection” between the prohibition and the government’s interest.187 In
dissent, Justice Alito (joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas) framed the
“intangible” harm at issue through monetary and trademark metaphors.
Unlike Justice Kennedy, for whom the lies were about “falsity and nothing
more,” the dissent argued that lies “debase the distinctive honor of military
awards.”188 Like trademark infringement, “the proliferation of false claims
about military awards blurs the signal given out by the actual awards by
making them seem more common than they really are, and this diluting
effect harms the military by hampering its efforts to foster morale and esprit
de corps.”189 Justice Kennedy’s solution, more speech in a “market” of
ideas, would not preserve the value of the medals but simply make matters
more confused. In sum, this ‘majority,’ of five concurring and dissenting
Justices, was willing to assume that the value to be protected was in part
government created, that it was presumably undercut by others pretending
to have received that value, and that harm to that form of value need not be
translated into a monetary or tangible form in order to garner recognition.190

184. Id.
185. Id. at 2547. This modification has been also proposed by Congressmen Heck (R-Nev).
H.R. 1775, 112th Cong. § 2(a) (2011) (amending the law to require an intent to “obtain anything
of value”), available at http:// heck.house.gov/sites/heck house.gov/files/Stolen% 20Valor% 20
Bill.pdf.
186. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2555 (Breyer, J., concurring).
187. Id. at 2555-56.
188. Id. at 2559 (Alito, J., dissenting).
189. Id.
190. Id. at 2552 (Breyer, J., concurring). Breyer applied an “intermediate scrutiny” test –
one in between the usually fatal strict scrutiny that Kennedy applied and the usually permissive
rational basis test. Breyer found that the government’s objective could be met in a less
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VI. PRIVATE CONTRACTORS: FROM MEDALS TO MONEY
This final section briefly examines the implications of the
government’s reliance on private military and security contractors in its
wars in Iraq and Afghanistan in light of our discussion of money and
medals. How are we to understand those laborers of war, private military
contractors, who are not eligible for most medals?191
The privatization and outsourcing of government functions has been
investigated from a number of perspectives. We can frame the shift to
contractors as a policy move away from notions of incommensurability,
sacrifice, and “primitive” money, and towards the money economy.192 The
rise of private contractors marks a new relation between the military and a
global labor market. Some contractors are highly skilled former soldiers
and United States citizens. But the bulk are local and third country
nationals performing manual jobs, often socially segregated from the
soldiers they service, and often recruited by middle-men.193 This
privatization and internationalization is relevant because contractors are
typically not eligible for medals – even though they have faced higher
fatalities than soldiers.194 They are not eligible for burial at Arlington
National Cemetery, and they are generally excluded from the robust
traditions through which soldier sacrifice is honored and recognized.195
Thus, the turn to contractors raises questions about the changing place of
sacrifice in military operations and in our political culture more broadly.196
Nonetheless, the government has deemed that contractors are eligible
for public honor as civilians, through awards such as the Defense of
Freedom Medal.197 This is described on an official website as the “civilian
burdensome manner, and thus the law created a “disproportionate constitutional harm.” Id. at
2540.
191. See AR 600-8-22, supra note 1, 53-54 tbl. 3-4. The regulation lists which medals may
be given to U.S. or foreign “civilians.” Id.; see also U.S. DEP’T OF THE ARMY, REG. 672-20,
INCENTIVE AWARDS, 4 tbl. 2-1 (29 Jan. 1999).
192. See supra notes 66-69 and accompanying text.
193. See AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION & YALE LAW SCH. LOWENSTEIN CLINIC, VICTIMS OF
COMPLACENCY: THE ONGOING TRAFFICKING AND ABUSE OF THIRD COUNTRY NATIONALS BY
U.S. GOVERNMENT CONTRACTORS 19 (2012); see also McCoy, supra note 84, at 676.
194. Miller, supra note 22; Schooner & Swan, supra note 22, at 13.
195. 32 C.F.R. § 553.15 (2009); see also Taussig-Rubbo, supra note 29, at 105; see also
Schooner & Swan, supra note 22, at 13.
196. Taussig-Rubbo, supra note 29, at 156 (this section draws on that discussion).
197. Defense of Freedom Medal Unveiled, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF. (Sept. 27, 2001),
http://www.defense.gov/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=3068; see also AR 600-8-22, supra note
1, at para. 2-8(l) (“The Defense of Freedom Medal, established on 4 October 2001, is the civilian
equivalent to the Purple Heart awarded to U.S. military personnel”); see also Jim Garamone,
Intelligence Agency Presents Defense of Freedom Medals, AM. FORCES INFO. SERV. (Oct. 19,
2001), osd.dtic mil/news/Oct2001/n10192001_200110192 html (“The medal commemorates their
valor and sacrifice.”).
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equivalent” of a Purple Heart, as both require the recipient to have been
injured or killed.198 The deaths may be called “sacrifices” and recognized
as deaths in the name of the nation,199 but the ceremonies where those
awards are given are often private events and exclude the media.200 It is not
only United States citizen contractors who are dying and being recognized
for their service. A United States Embassy representative, when awarding
the Defense of Freedom medal in Fiji, explained to the Fiji Times that “the
ceremony was to honour the five men who bravely laid down their lives as
part of an international effort to fight terrorism and create freedom.”201
Furthermore, some contractor companies have developed their own medals.
The company formerly known as Blackwater, for instance, gave out its
Worldwide Defense of Liberty Medal to injured contractors at a private
event.202 Thus, while the shift to contactors is a shift out of the military’s
medal system, there are some signs of a new medal system emerging.
There is an attempt to institutionalize both the sacrifice and a non-monetary
notion of value of service – but in a manner that protects or excludes the
public.
In sum, we can characterize the turn to contractors as a turn away from
the military’s medal system. At the same time, there are some indications
that contractor companies and the government are improvising and
developing an alternate medal system. What are the potential implications
of the shift out of the traditional medal system? One factor concerns
198. U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 197.
199. T. Christian Miller, War Contractors Receive Defense of Freedom Medal for Injuries,
But Attract Little Notice, PROPUBLICA (Feb. 18, 2010), http://defensebaseactcomp.
wordpress.com/2010/02/18/war-contractors-receive-defense-of-freedom-medal-for-injuries-butattract-little-notice.
200. T. Christian Miller, The Battle Scars of a Private War, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 12, 2007, at
A1. The Los Angeles Times described one ceremony in which:
Executives in dark blue suits shifted uncomfortably as an Army major general in battle
fatigues awarded posthumous Defense of Freedom medals to the families’ loved ones,
all contractors killed while working in Iraq. But this was no public recognition of
sacrifice. The event was held in secret, with guards to keep out the media. The Army
even refused to release the names of those it was honoring. The nation’s gratitude was
delivered behind closed doors.
Id.
201. Monica Singh, Local War Casualties Get Medals, FIJI TIMES ONLINE (Aug. 15, 2008),
http://www fijitimes.com/story.aspx?id=97870.
202. The Blackwater name was changed to Xe, and the company is now known as Academi.
See ACADEMI, http://academi.com/pages/about-us/introduction (last visited Jan. 6, 2013) (“Our
name comes from the Greek akademia, an institution founded by Plato and rooted in higher
wisdom and skill, producing both thinkers and warriors alike. ACADEMI is that institution
today.”); see also Defense Watch, DEFENSE DAILY (June 23, 2008), 2008 WLNR 13239185
(“Since it wasn’t a public event, the company did not release the names of those honored to the
media.” President of Blackwater, Eric Prince “presented ‘The Blackwater Worldwide Defense of
Liberty Medal’ to each contractor. ‘I thank each and every one of you for your many sacrifices
and for your distinguished, selfless service,’ Prince said.”).
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democratic accountability: if the awarding of medals serves as a
governmental and societal reckoning of the costs of war, then, not paying in
that currency will presumably avoid awareness of that cost. Another factor
concerns equity: while contractors may oftentimes be undertaking the more
banal and less dramatic work of war, presumably there are instances in
which, were they soldiers, they would be eligible for an award. In such an
instance, the award system can seem arbitrary, based on ex ante status and
not on individual conduct. This restates the question of the value of medals
already discussed: do they create value or do they simply recognize what is
already there? The question of equity also provokes a different reaction: if
it is a valid assumption that the contractor is motivated primarily by money,
not sacrifice and service, it may be entirely appropriate to exclude them
from these other forms of compensation that are offered to the soldier.
The rise of the private contractor puts the Stolen Valor Act in a
different light. We have a class of persons who may have some plausible
claim to the recognition bestowed by medals – but who are per se excluded
from the military medals system in general. Through a policy of not
recognizing contractors’ eligibility for most medals, is their “valor” being
stolen as well? If the concern with the false claimant is that they dilute the
meaning of medals, here the concern is that the value may be artificially
inflated by excluding the large number of third-world workers who may
also act heroically. And how do the efforts to create ersatz medals, such as
Blackwater’s, compare to the conduct the Stolen Valor Act seeks to punish?
Are these an effort to steal valor as well; or are they appropriate privatesector solutions to address an inequitable defect in public policy?
And yet there seem to be great dangers in allowing contractors to
receive both money and the same medals and public honor awarded within
the military. Given our analysis of the important role of the medals within
the military, opening up the Pyramid of Honor to contractors would seem to
risk confounding and undermining the medal currency and its place within
the military world. To put the concern bluntly, while the government
explicitly bans the imposter, we may wonder whether it has itself created a
class of imposters through its outsourcing policy; or, more sympathetically
to the contractors, whether Congress has improperly excluded a class of
labor from proper recognition.
The most obvious link between money and medals is one not
mentioned yet: that privatization or outsourcing saves money. While this is
an oft-repeated claim, what is striking about the military outsourcing over
the past decade is the lack of effort expended in collecting even the most
rudimentary figures that would enable officials to test the claim of lower
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cost, such as the number of contractors engaged or the total cost.203 Due to
a particularity of the military budgeting process, contractors are often hired
through contingency funds and thus are often perceived, by senior officials
in the military, as “free.”204 But what is incontrovertible is that
privatization has proved efficient in terms of moving much military labor
out of the heavily sacramental category of soldier – eligible for medals, for
recognition for national sacrifice, and so forth – and into the less august
category of contractor. To pay in money is to assert that the debt can be
settled, and thus permits the government to avoid the complexities of the
medals as a social currency.
To see the medal as the socially meaningful token that marks social
interconnectedness and money as impersonal and lacking in social meaning
would be, however, to forget Hart’s image of the two sides of the coin. The
shift to contractors and paying in money should not be seen as a shift to the
“market” in any simple sense. Both money and medals are, in part, statist
undertakings. They differ, however, in how they display their sociability.
Money presents itself as abstract and impersonal, even while created by the
sovereign. Medals, especially those for valor and suffering, do not claim
that the relation between the giver and recipient is thereby concluded.
VII. CONCLUSION
This Article has examined multiple intersections between, and
definitions of, medals and money.
In the discussion of George
Washington’s Purple Heart, it seemed that giving medals was a way to
compensate for not giving money. Drawing on Radin and a notion of
incommensurability, medals articulated an understanding that some types of
action could not be paid for in money. But the Article did not simply
203. See COMM’N ON WARTIME CONTRACTING IN IRAQ & AFG., AT WHAT COST?
CONTINGENCY CONTRACTING IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN, INTERIM REPORT16-17 (2009).
204. See COMM’N ON WARTIME CONTRACTING, supra note 20, at 22. The Commission
report recounts that:
For many senior officials, contractors appear to be a “free” source of labor with no
direct impact on their budgets. Funded out of what they perceive to be unconstrained
overseas contingency-operation budgets, many senior officials pay scant attention to
articulating specific support requirements, negotiating contract terms, and managing
contractor performance. A general officer who briefed the Commission during its visit
to Kuwait in February 2010 said that if there is no budget restriction and all contractsupport requirements are met, then commanders have no incentive to consider costs.
Despite the critical nature of contingency acquisition, this relatively lax approach
stands in stark contrast to the way DoD manages its military personnel. Although
some improvements have been made, agency officials still have little incentive to
consider costs and therefore may choose to minimize performance risk by consuming
and paying more than is reasonable or necessary.
Id.
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confound the divide between medals and money by asking whether medals
could be seen as money, or whether they were truly different kinds of value.
It also asked whether medals could be seen as a social currency as
described by anthropologists, a form of money often worn as adornment.
While appealing, this asserted parallel between the medal system and a
social currency has a number of caveats in that the medal system does not
operate through individuals’ local knowledge of credit distributions and is
created (or recognized) by the state. The value of social currencies was, as
Graeber contended, typically local.205 And it emerged in contexts where
there is no state. In other words, it is not surprising that a social currency,
such as the medal system in a mass society, will encounter the problem of
fraud and counterfeiting, since the value does not emerge out of local and
individually tracked credit relations. Indeed, what our examination has
encountered again and again was that the medal is a fascinating
combination of “primitive” money and impersonal, abstract, and statecreated value. It is, we might say, itself a fake kind of social currency –
fake because it is created by a centralized authority. And yet it is not only a
state creation for it purports to recognize valor, heroism and sacrifice, and
in this dimension is genuinely a social currency that allows a persons’ value
to be visible through adornment.
In Graeber’s story, states, armies and abstract, decontextualized forms
of money emerged together. Thus, to find a social currency occupying a
central place in the military is noteworthy. The truly fascinating issue is the
interdependence between the state’s two currencies: its actual money and its
medal system. The key question is whether the state needs its medal
currency. We can depict our current order as one composed of both a
universal money form that has penetrated more social orders than ever
before with a single measure and store of value, but which also relies on a
strange form of social currency.
The issue of what sort of value the state could create, and what steps it
could take to protect that value, were at the heart of the Supreme Court’s
decision in Alvarez. Justice Kennedy did not see the value of the social
status that the medal system created as one presumptively harmed by false
claims, and he indicated that linking the offense to some material loss could
preserve the law. A loss of money, even though simply another state
symbol, was tangible. A loss in the valor system consisting of dilution was
intangible.
Justice Kennedy articulated a non-statist, intrinsic,
understanding of the value of medals. By this view, the valor of the true
hero cannot be stained by the false claimant. The Supreme Court’s decision
205. See GRAEBER, supra note 45, at 213.
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removes one tool for policing the boundaries of military honor; and yet, the
rest of the statute restricting the manufacture, wearing, and sale of medals
remains in force, as does the exclusion of contractors from the medal
system.
This Article began by noting the repeated invocation, in the context of
the debate around the Stolen Valor Act, of the story of George Washington
and the creation of the Purple Heart. Rather than situating ourselves as
within that tradition, perhaps our order is better seen as an inversion of
Washington’s story. Washington “paid” in valor rather than money because
the Congress was out of money. Now, the United States increasingly pays
in money rather than valor. This may be a concern if the medal currency
serves a valuable role in enhancing the accountability of the government
and military to the population at large by requiring officials to acknowledge
publicly the human impact of war-making. On the other hand, this
recognition could also serve to disempower the public if it positions them as
grateful recipients of the soldier’s beneficence. If paying in medals may
mean that the pay offered the soldier was not enough – that pay is never
enough – then the medal signifies an ongoing obligation. This may be
appropriate, but it is also troubling. That, surely, is an attraction of the
contractor – that accounts can be settled.
Is the end point, then, a rather familiar story: that yet another domain of
life succumbs to the ethos of the market, and commensurability as
measured in money? Things are probably not so simple, and such a
conclusion would ignore the continued importance of the medal system in
the military. More plausibly, the lesson to take from our examination of the
multitude of conceptions of value is that our obligations to one another are
not contained in one form of currency and credit, be it money or medals.

